Is Atheism Unreasonable? A Conversation with Alvin Plantinga

Is Atheism Unreasonable? A Conversation with Alvin Plantinga This is the first in a series of interviews on religion, this time with Alvin Plantinga, professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, former president of both the Christian Philosophers’ Association and the American Philosophical Society, and author of the recently released book, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Gary Gitting: A recent study by PhilPapers suggests that 62% of philosophers are atheists (along with 11% who are inclined to this view). Do you think that the literature of philosophy offers a critique of theological theism to justify their views? Or do you think that philosophers’ atheism is determined by factors other than rational analysis? Alvin Plantinga: If 62% of philosophers are atheists, this means that atheists among philosophers are far more likely than, in fact, nearly twice as likely to be atheists in academia generally. "I define atheism here as the belief that there is no such thing as a god of divinity".[1] Now do these philosophers know something here other than what other academics teach? However, this is not enough for atheism. In the British newspaper The Independent, the naturalist Richard Dawkins recently asked this question: “If you were to die and then come to the gates of paradise, what would you tell God to justify your lifelong atheism?” God! There was not enough evidence." But the lack of evidence, if there is indeed a lack of evidence, does not provide a basis for atheism. No one believes that there is valid evidence for the hypothesis that there is an even number of stars, but also no one believes that the correct conclusion that can be drawn here is that there is an even number of stars. Instead, the correct conclusion would be agnosticism. By the same token, the failure of theistic arguments, if indeed there are failures, can reasonably be considered a valid basis for agnosticism, but not for atheism.[2] Atheism, as we speak of the pairing of stars, is assumed to be the kind of belief that can be rationally held only if you have strong arguments or evidence. Many atheists deny this, and say that all they have to do is point to the lack of any valid evidence. You are comparing atheism to the denial that there are even numbers of stars, which of course requires evidence. But atheists, using the example of Bertrand Russell, say that you should instead compare atheism with a teapot. Plantinga: Russell's idea, as I understand it, is that we don't really have any evidence against the teapot hypothesis, but we don't need it. The lack of evidence is proof of nothingness, and that's enough to support the teapot hypothesis. We don't need proof against this hypothesis to justify a belief in its invalidity, and maybe the same thing for the divine doctrine. I disagree, we obviously have a great deal of evidence against the jug hypothesis. So, for example, as far as science goes, the only way a teapot could have been in orbit around the sun is if a country with advanced launch capabilities had launched that jug into orbit. In other words, in order for an atheist to justify his position, he must, just as the believer must, on the premise of the jug, possess strong evidence against theistic belief.[3] Gitting: But is there not much evidence against theistic belief – and above all this alleged amount of evil, by a fully capable God, and all good to and from Him? Plantinga: The problem known as the "problem of evil" is probably the strongest evidence – and perhaps the only evidence – that can be invoked against theistic belief. It already has some force. It is reasonable to think that the probability of proving theistic belief, with all this evil and suffering in the world, would be reasonably small.[4] But there are also arguments for theistic belief, of course, if it were ever possible. But when you say that "there is a good variety of good arguments," you do not mean that they are decisive; in the sense that they are so valid as to convince any reasonable person who understands them. Plantinga: First of all, I have to make it clear that I do not see that arguments are required for a rational belief in God.[6] With this consideration, belief in the Creator becomes like belief in the existence of other minds, or like belief in the past. Belief in God is embedded in human experience, or in instinctus divinitatis, which is John Calvin's term for a natural tendency to form beliefs about God in a wide variety of circumstances.[7] However, I believe that there are a few. JT: Can you cite an example of those arguments? Plantinga: From the present and fairly common arguments: the fine tuning argument. Scientists tell us that there are properties that the universe exhibits to the extent that if life, or at least our kind of life, were little different from what it actually is, it would not be possible. The universe seems to have fine tuning of life. For example, if the force of the Big Bang were also one part (10 to 60), life of the species would not be possible. Gitting: But even if the argument of fine-tuning – or any similar argument – convinces someone that God exists, isn’t it too short for the divine doctrine of Christianity, specifically the issue of a perfect God? Plantinga: I think your thinking is that it is suffering and sin that make this world less than perfect. But in this case, you will only make sense when the best possible worlds are the ones where there is no suffering and no sin. Is that true? Think about it: the first being in the universe, complete in its goodness, power, and knowledge, creates free beings. These free beings turn their backs on him[11], rebel against him[12], and become entangled in sin and evil. Instead of being treated like an ancient ruling power – for example, boiling them in oil – God responds by sending His Son to the world to suffer and die, so that the sons of men may return to their rightful relationship with God.[13] I would say that a world in which this story is true would be a truly glorious possible world. It would be so good that no other world could be better. Even here the better worlds would include sin and suffering. The possibility remains that we will find a scientific explanation for what we have been claiming that only God can explain. After all, this is what happened when Darwin developed his theory of evolution. Bluntinga: On the face of it, some atheists believe that a sufficient reason to convert to atheism is the fact, they claim, that we no longer need God to explain natural phenomena, such as lightning and thunder. As a justification for atheism, this is a very sweeping argument. We do not need the moon to explain or explain the state of insanity.[17] It is hardly necessary, therefore, that the belief in the absence of the moon (the state of the moon?) should be justified; the non-atheist position would have a reasonable basis only if the only basis for believing in the existence of the moon was its explanatory power related to the fact of insanity. JT: So what are the other grounds for believing in God, and the reasons why atheism is not justified? Plantinga: Perhaps the most important basis for belief in God is not philosophical arguments but religious experience. Many people, from many diverse cultures, have found an experience that connects them to a worthy object of worship. They believe in a God as such, but not because of the interpretive prowess of that belief. Indeed, if the divine position is true, it is highly likely that there is something resembling the concept of innateness. To claim that the only reasonable basis for belief in God is the explanatory efficiency of that belief is essentially equivalent to endorsing the hypothesis of atheism.[16] GTING: So, since there are no arguments in favor of atheism, why do you think so many philosophers – presumably very rational people – are atheists? Plantinga: I'm not a psychologist, so I don't have a special science here. However, there are some possible explanations. Thomas Nagel, a brilliant philosopher and atheist with extraordinary insight, has stated that he simply doesn't want to have a being with qualities like God. It's not hard to know why. One thing: there will be what some consider an intolerable violation of privacy; God will know every one of my thoughts before I even think of it. The desire for independence can amount to a very remote amount,[17] as in the case of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who, as Richard Rorty recounted, felt guilty about living in a universe he himself did not create.[18] We now have a soft conscience![19] Yet a desire for independence far below can stimulate atheism. Gitting: Materialism seems to be a major motivation, especially among atheists today, as they believe that there is nothing beyond physical entities that can allow itself to be researched, and therefore there is no place for immaterial beings, such as God. Plantinga: Well, if there are only physical entities, then atheism is absolutely necessary. But materialism faces a very serious dilemma: it is not reasonably believable, at least if, like most materialists, you believe that human beings are the product of evolution. JT: And why is that? Plantinga: I can't make the argument here a complete report - see in this tenth chapter of the book Where does the contradiction really lie?), but roughly, I'll explain why. First, if materialism is true, humans are, naturally, material things. Now, from this point of view, what would it mean to believe that Marcel Proust is more intelligent than, say, Louis Lamore? Jetting: So you're suggesting that belief can't be this neurophysiological entity, and that belief must be immaterial in some way? Plantinga: That may be so, but that’s not my point here. I’m interested in the belief that certain beliefs are, at least in part, action-inducing. For example, my belief that there’s an alcoholic drink in the fridge, and my desire to have that drink, can cause me to wake up from my comforting couch and walk lean into the fridge. But here’s the point: the belief has caused action thanks to its physiological neurophysical properties. JT: Why would you say that? Plantinga: Because if this belief had a completely different content (even if we say that it is the belief that there is no drink in the refrigerator) but the same neurophysiological properties, it would also cause the same thing to happen to me going to the fridge. This means that the belief content is not a reason for behavior.[20] If everything that would cause behavior is involved, the belief content does not matter. But can’t evolution get materialism out of this predicament? In order for our species to survive, it’s assumed that more – if not all – of our beliefs were necessarily true, or else we wouldn’t behave as we should in a dangerous world. Plantinga:[21] Evolution will lead us to acquire adaptive beliefs; that is, beliefs that cause adaptive actions. But, as we have seen, if materialism is true, belief does not cause adaptive action by its content, but it will cause adaptive action by its neurophysiological properties, and therefore the content of belief does not matter, nor will it matter whether that content is true or false in itself. Evolution will elect processes that will produce beliefs with adaptive neurophysiological properties, and will not elect processes that will produce correct beliefs. In the light of materialism and evolution, any belief will be equally preponderant in terms of validity and invalidity. JT: So you're saying that if materialism is true, then evolution doesn't lead to most of our beliefs being true. Plantinga: That's right. In fact, by embracing evolution and materialism, what's needed is that our faculties responsible for the creation of beliefs become unreliable.[22] I'll explain why: when a belief is outweighed by validity and invalidity, then we have to say that the probability of a belief being true is 50%. Now assume that we have a total of 100 independent beliefs (of course we have some more). Remember that the probability of each belief being true in a given set is even higher. But to believe that means to fall into complete doubt, which leaves you without any reason to accept any of your beliefs (including your beliefs about materialism and evolution!). The only reasonable way is to abandon the claim that leads to this result; the claim that materialism and evolution are true together. Perhaps you may adopt one of the parties to this claim without the other, but not both. If you are an atheist simply because you accept materialism, the integrity of your atheism means that you have to give up the belief that evolution is true. In other words, the belief that both materialism and evolution are true is self-defeating. (*) Original article: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational They are sometimes called Abrahamic or monotheistic, though we do not recognize as Muslims the content of this launch historically. [2] If we talk about the reality of existence and the reality of the meaning of life, and the facts of what we call: morality, reason and truth, then one can not be fair only to be agnostic or agnostic. But to be an atheist Agnostic is not correct. Yes, it is possible to claim, but it is not real in the same matter. [3] For the importance of this issue, this article is accompanied by a paragraph entitled (a brief proof of positive atheism from its origin), adapted from (three letters in atheism, science and faith). [4] It is important to point out that the negative power of this evidence varies from religion to religion. The Christian narrative, as Plantinga will decide later, is frail and inherently increases the power of the suspicion of evil. Unlike the narrative that one constructs in an integrated manner from the Qur’an and true Sunnah, it weakens this suspicion, if not eradicates it. We have a seer, a perspective and a view. Neither the corruption of the seer (psychological/social disorder) nor the corruption of the view (cognitive/inferential disorder) is necessary. Thus, the evidence may be decisive in terms of its significance; in the sense that it cannot indicate the opposite of what is indicated by the personality only arbitrariness and distortion, but the recipient will not recognize it as an example. According to this concept, one is directly required to believe, and this concept has been popularized in Protestant doctrine and has been able to become an origin of belief in it. Barth (1968-1886) states: "God is known only by what he says." [See: Thiselton, A. (2002) A Concise Encyclopaedia of Religion]. [7] Sensus divinitatis is pronounced “sen-soos dee-vee-ni-ta-tis.” An authentic Prophetic tradition states that every child is born with the fitrah, the innate disposition. Commenting on this hadith, Ibn Taymiyyah said: “He fashioned the hearts so that, among what they love and desire, they find their ultimate rest and fulfillment in God alone.” Majmu‘ al-Fatawa (4/249). Studies by Justin Barrett and anthropologist James Leuba have examined this aspect and affirmed the existence of this natural tendency. In his book The Existence of God, the theologian Richard Swinburne blames the atheists for their individual consideration of the evidence, and decides that if they had taken it as a sentence, its combined significance would have been stronger. [9] It is no secret that there is a reticence and controversy about the expression "exist", but its common sense that God exists does not oblige us to discuss this issue here. In fact, the story of Christianity doubles and does not solve it, nor is it close to serving as an example to the whole world, whether considering the origin of the deviation in the Christian faith in historical terms, or considering the existential significance of the story of Christianity in itself. And man was ungrateful. And the infidel against his Lord was a helper. This is the witness of the story that makes the whole story of Christianity so fascinating, even though Plantinga perceives it as the source of its power or distinctiveness. [14] The problems of this perception are added to the problems of the perception that preceded it; as well as clashing with the truth of the Holy Quran, the mind faces. It may be said: Why did not face mind in the position of mind Plantinga? The answer is that the mind does not have a state of continent when leaving its normal state; therefore, Christians accept the self-contradiction of the doctrine of trinity without hesitation, although they feel that they themselves do not. [15] Refers to the myth that links the full moon to the occurrence of madness for some people. [16] In this claim there is an apparent exaggeration, if not a nullity. Likewise, his reduction of the explanatory power of belief in God is also under consideration; God is the strongest, most supreme, and highest explanatory power that the human mind can reach or assume. Jerome Karle, a Nobel laureate in chemistry, puts it this way: “The concept of God is a summation of the highest experience that man can imagine in his existence.” Eugene Wigner, a recent Nobel laureate, goes further and believes that “the concept of God...helps us make our decisions in the right direction.” “I’m afraid we would be different from what we are today if we didn’t have that concept,” he said. To deepen our understanding of this piece, I appended to this translation a paragraph excerpted in length from my book (Three Letters in Atheism, Science and Faith). [17] Look at the factor of human independence and its atheistic implications, pp. 51-73 of my book (three letters in atheism, science and faith), Dar Nama. [18] On self-sufficiency, God Almighty says: “No! Indeed, the human being transgresses when he considers himself self-sufficient.” On assuming the role of God, He says: “Have you seen the one who takes his own desire as his god?” [19] The soft or slave conscience in Catholic theology is a hierarchy of piety and observation in which consciousness is sensitive to any religious infraction or default. Plantinga must provide exceptional and likely evidence to make this origin likely. Plantinga needs to look for another course of action to complement the usefulness of this argument and its logical validity. “Evolution will elect processes that will produce beliefs with neurological properties,” Plantinga will say. [21] Good in both cases because it has achieved its adaptive function in both cases, without the need to be aware of the value of the content in terms of health and invalidity. To enrich this part and further clarify this translation was attached a paragraph quoted from (three letters in atheism, science and faith) explaining the shortcomings of naturalism in the light of this argument Plantinga. Darwin himself was particularly concerned about this problem: "I always have a terrible doubt as to whether the convictions of the human mind, which in turn evolved from the minds of lower beings, have any value or deserve the slightest trust." [See Charles Darwin to W. Graham, July 3, 1881, In Darwin, F.; edit. (1911) The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin Vol. - Gary Jetting - Translated and commented by Dr. Abdullah Al-Shehri — Source: Brahin Center website - Posted on 2015-06-06 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/philosophy/هل-الإلحاد-لاعقلاني؟-حوار-جاري-جتنج-مع-ألفن-بلانتنجا