Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (2)

Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (2) * Note: This series is from the book (Human Consensus) For more please see the book. Paul Veraband's model: If Thomas Kohn had admitted that the elevation of science from other human activities was merely a hypothesis after his inability to prove a criterion for progress, Fireband was courageous and did not favour a dogmatic hypothesis, one of the most influential and controversial philosophers of the 20th century, and has a great credit for Thomas Kohn and Emery Lakatosh in their philosophy, with his research on the idea of the impossibility of comparison. In his 1975 book Against Method, Fairaband presented a chaotic plan for science, which had been translated into seventeen languages by 1994 alone. This book has angered many scholars and philosophers alike, but it is agreed that Fairaband was a checker and an argumentator, albeit enveloping it in terms that would provoke most of his contemporaries. Feyerabend's book consists of two main parts: the first deals with epistemological and logical issues; the second deals with some of the political and social consequences of the first, which is rare for philosophers of science. Feyerabend begins his attack on traditional research methods in all their forms, which the philosophers of science have been promoting and trying to convince us that it is the difference between science and non-science, as science advances in their philosophy by collecting facts and then inferring theories from them, but this traditional answer to what the method looks like does not seem convincing to anyone, because theories are not required for facts in the strict sense, and does not fit the concept of support or reinforcement to defend the method of science. If so, what is the ideal approach to science? What are the correct rules for it? We are struck by the fact that science has no method of its own that distinguishes it from any other activity, or makes it worthy of a greater degree of respect as providing true and truthful knowledge, says Firaband: The idea of a scientific approach that includes strict, unchanging and absolutely binding principles faces great difficulties when compared to the results of research historically ... there is no single relationship, however seemingly possible or grounded. Feyerabend does not see the transgression or violation of the rules of the scientific method as accidental, or occurring in rare cases, nor is it the result of a lack of our knowledge or of something that can be remedied or overcome, but he sees the contrary, this transgression is necessary for the progress of science. He confirms this by saying: No matter how much the rules of the method by which the philosophers of science appear to us necessary and fundamental, there are always circumstances that call for not only ignoring these rules but adopting their opposite[4], and then he gives several examples from the history of science to prove this, and says elsewhere: The idea that science can and should be organized according to fixed and universal rules is at once utopian and of deceptive luster. It is utopian because it involves an overly simple conception of the solutions to man's predispositions or abilities, about the conditions that encourage or cause them to grow, and it is deceptively glamorous in that the attempt to enforce these rules is only to the detriment of our humanity; moreover, such an idea is harmful to science, because it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions that truly influence scientific change. His student, Alan Chalmers, agrees: "If we mean by the methods of science rules to guide the choices and decisions of those involved in science, we cannot but agree with Fireband, every scientific situation is realistic and complex, growing in an unpredictable way, so it is absurd to wish to find a method that can show the rational world in a given context whether to adopt theory X by rejecting theory Y or vice versa. Fireband negates the idea of the criterion of the scientific community in the first place, scientists only have to follow their imaginations or what seems to them important and exciting, and the reason for the invalidity of any criterion in his view that scientific activity is not a purely objective or rational activity, if scientific progress is the displacement of theories to be replaced by new theories, this process often includes elements "irrational" i.e. unjustified or justified, and this is evidenced by the following point: In order for logical positivism to overcome the subjectivity of science, Reichenbach made a preliminary distinction, followed by many, including Karl Popper, between the context of disclosure and the context of justification. The context of disclosure is about trying to discover rules, techniques, or means to uncover theories. The context of justification is concerned with objective principles to justify and evaluate competing theories in the light of available evidence. This distinction is one of the fundamental tenets of the Vienna Circle: there is a difference between tracing historical origins, psychological origin, and social and political conditions to the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories, and offering a logical reconstruction of conceptual construction and testing of scientific theories. For Feyerabend, the distinction between the context of revelation and the context of justification is illusory, accepting the results of any practical experiment mixed with subjective elements and personal tendencies of the group of different scientists, and thus the distinction between these two contexts is not real and artificial, as it can not be just a random confusion, and justification includes many subjective elements, in Feyerabend's words: The distinction between the context of disclosure and the context of justification is never real, the disclosure is never a leap in the dark. We must not separate the physical sciences and the humanities and transcend the first over the second, complete objectivity is an illusion, and is the main reason why society looks at physical progress and does not feel progress in the humanities. If Thomas Kohn had made the scientific standard of progress the leaps between indicative models by being a transition from religion to religion within a psychological framework of the scientific community but largely governed by the rules agreed upon as a methodology: Fireband does not see this, and does not even care about rules at all, scientific reality is complicated because it is a human practice, in which man enters with his anarchism and overlapping patterns of behavior and decisions, and therefore no rules embedded in their scientific practice can be understood by the scientific community. Since science is a human practice, there is no room for preference over any other late practice, and Feyerabend complains that scientists often judge the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge without trying to figure out these latter forms in a precise way, but it is noted that Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn were greatly influenced by the idea of language games and images of life presented by Wittgenstein, but neither of them - and Wittgenstein also gave a specific way to evaluate gay games such as Astrology and others. Another point by which Feyerabend ends up being completely subjective is that of incomparability, one of the key points in his analysis of science, "If observation cannot be a priori the theory, and observation must take place within a given context in which the observation is to be interpreted, in some cases the basic principles of two competing theories may be so far apart that it is impossible even to formulate the principles of one theory in terms of another theory. It follows that the two competing theories do not share any of their respective observations, nor is it possible to logically deduce some of the results from the principles of the competing theory from the perspective of comparing them, and therefore the two theories are not comparable. To take an example presented by Fairaband to show his idea, which is the relationship between classical mechanics and the theory of relativity, the first physical subjects according to classical mechanics have a sense of form, mass and size, which are inherent and adjacent properties of physical subjects and can be modified as a result of a physical interaction, but in the theory of relativity will not be so, but these properties - form, mass and size - have become the meaning of relations between subjects and a particular reference system, and can be modified in the theory of relativity will not be so. The system of new concepts created by the theory of relativity not only denies the existence of classical states and facts, but even goes so far as not to allow us to formulate even words that express such states and facts; this system does not share with its predecessor even one operative, and cannot do so, always considering that we do not use theories as sketches or taxonomic diagrams to arrange neutral facts or phenomena. From this argument, Feyerabend draws an extreme and highly subjective conclusion, namely, that the whole of science is self-governing over the world, like aesthetic judgments, like taste, after failing to identify certain criteria by which to compare what is left in the evaluation is "our own desires". The second part of Feyerabend's book is about society, which is like warning against the domination of experimental science as an ideology, how science has become a religion, how scientific facts are indoctrinated in the same way as the facts of religion previously in Europe, and respect for the man of science is the same kind of respect that was given to the cleric. But Feyerabend did not offer an alternative to how to evaluate scientific theories, and this is a major problem in his philosophy, so that the solutions he offers have made a mockery of his entire philosophy, like the ballot boxes, that elections are held to vote on scientific theories! [1] Three Conversations in Knowledge, p. [2] Ibid., p. 11. [3] Ibid., p. 12. [4] Ibid., p. 12. [5] Theories of Science, 134-135. [6] Ibid., p. 135. [7] Three Conversations in Knowledge, p. [8] Three Conversations, p. [9] Theories of Science, p. [10] Ibid., p. 138. [11] Ibid., p. 138. - Reza Zeidan. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published 2020-11-14 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/science-scientism/مقارنة-حجية-الإجماع-بين-الجماعة-العلمية-والجماعة-البشرية-2