The Atheist Society: Between Wittgenstein and Chomsky

The Atheist Society: Between Wittgenstein and Chomsky Every phenomenon, however historically similar to other phenomena, contains the characteristic of its age and its unrelenting nature. The illusion of abstracting it from its human forms isolates it from understanding. Because the human mind is circumstantially determined by factors that determine its ways of understanding and consciousness, and trying to isolate intellectual phenomena from its human determinants does not provide an internal solution to them. Conscious assimilation is a kind of containment of these phenomena, and then complete them with analysis and disassembly so that we can reach a deeper understanding. Such as images, programming, and other concepts that study consciousness as a system governed by sufficient internal rules; logical or genetic or idealistic schools that do not see the feasibility of returning to symbolic social consciousness formations to understand its phenomena.2 In general, the requirement of circumstantial and historical to understand the enormous diversity of human phenomena, asserts that writings that are not implemented by this requirement lack the synchronization of their solutions, which means that they do not analyze and study this particular phenomenon, but create another phenomenon. Since the mental process needs symbols to understand and realize, and the equivalence of these schools among themselves by isolating reality from the phenomenon and dropping supposed symbols on a certain phenomenon, does not make the analyses of these phenomena only fly over reality! One of the most important phenomena that deserves to be repeatedly studied, understood and repeated on several levels and places is the phenomenon of contemporary atheism; this atheistic phenomenon has several manifestations and determinants that make it different from and radically different from its predecessors. Among them, it begs and even mobilizes social mechanisms and scientific mechanisms, in order to establish a theoretical possibility of an atheistic society. Since it – i.e. society – does not have the concept of arbitrariness that requires it to end in nihilism if we identify with it, the concept of axioms is of paramount importance in order to limit the axiom of the atheistic language to its best possible outcome. The “programming” advocated by evolutionary linguistics, if true, can assume in its definition of the concepts of consciousness, society and symbols that the concept of “atheistic society” is only possible. Far from religion, since it has historically been the basic framework for understanding human societies for themselves. Relativity in this software concept consists of the wide variety of applications of the symbolism of evolutionary linguistics according to the variety of societal agitations, but nevertheless the form of "atheist life" in my opinion is not resistant to theoretical criticism, but is protected by the intellectual model framed for the scientific community. The reason for its abstention is due to several considerations, including: • The programming proposed—or threatened—by evolutionary linguistics, in relation to religion’s influence in the society within which human morality has developed throughout history, rests on the concept of “innate rules.” The American philosopher Noam Chomsky strongly promoted this concept, and evolutionists adopted it from him; he is himself one of them. These rules are explained through inherited genetic codes governed by the game of evolution. A game? Yes: rules exist to be used. Use, in Wittgenstein’s sense, also presupposes rules, although his understanding of their meaning and role differs from evolutionary linguistics. The following paragraphs will explain why treating evolution as a game requires certain indispensable conditions. In general, “rules” are a crucial concept deserving close consideration. Programming within the evolutionary “game” assumes that innate rules are causally sufficient for the atheist’s language to generate infinitely many sentences from finite data prompted by society. But how can we understand these rules as something not “programmed,” but “followed,” as a shared necessity for learning and speaking? The claim that a learner cannot reach an understanding of rules through examples or experience alone assumes that language is arbitrary and lacks meaning in its deep structure. Initial meaning arises in finite sentences prompted by social stimuli, which activate a biological linguistic capacity to generate infinitely many sentences. Social context is therefore subsequent in this account. An “atheist” form of life is not given in advance by genetic programming; it is determined by the response of the supposedly causally sufficient capacity to society’s stimuli. Thus, treating social examples or symbolic experience as insufficient for language learning follows from the programmatic understanding of rules. But what if we reverse this and say that rules are insufficient without social examples? If biological rules are, on this view, merely arbitrary symbols that require a social context for symbolic experience to give them initial meaning, should we not reconsider causal sufficiency? Calling it sufficient and genetically programmed sits uneasily with describing its symbols as fixed. Its need for social action undermines that sufficiency: it is acted upon rather than acting independently, because it requires context. Its supposedly fixed structure must redefine itself, and that redefinition contradicts its being a sufficient cause. A cause is marked by regularity rather than change. A condition, by contrast, is something whose absence entails absence, while its presence alone entails neither presence nor absence until all accompanying conditions are fulfilled. What do “conditions” mean here? Are they not close to Wittgenstein’s concept of context? Both conditionality and contextual rules vary with the circumstances of natural languages, unlike a cause understood as invariant: its presence entails the effect’s presence and its absence the effect’s absence. Moreover, this conditional interdependence contains a paradox. The changing rules and examples, according to contextual conditions, suggest that “following rules” more accurately describes their role in acquiring language. If linguistic capacity were causally sufficient, its symbolic rules would not change after language acquisition. This also supports Wittgenstein’s earlier statement that inner processes of consciousness require external criteria. Linguistic capacity consequently becomes one condition among the contextual conditions of acquiring and learning language, rather than being causally sufficient. Understanding rule-following and change in this way rules out an “atheist” form of life: human symbolic capacity requires external criteria, and the relationship between that inner need and its interaction with external criteria contains a paradox that cannot be bypassed. Thus, “the meaning of the world must lie outside the world. Within the world, everything is as it is and happens as it happens. There is no value within it; if there were, it would have no value. If there is value that has value, it must lie outside the totality of happenings and the existence of things as they are. That totality is contingent. What makes it non-contingent cannot lie within the world, for it would then itself be contingent. It must lie outside the world” (3). * One of the important distinctions that show the vast difference between following the rules and programming them, is the difference between the code and its logical meaning. The procedure requires rules because the language is systematic and not because the language is a deep structure encoded genetically, and the language games format requires rules because it is part of the form of life that it expresses. This form requires supplies in the speaker; Since the human life is meaningful, the conditional connection with everything around it is conditions within the general context. Since it is only a branch of the arbitrary evolutionary tree. One profound difference between following and programming is that the first accepts the possibility of building a context on the ruins of some of the contextual conditions that helped build it, and this paradox, despite its theoretical ability to re-reveal and describe the later contextual conditions in the worlds of the paradoxes of natural language, but it is only a condition. The concept of following the rules derived from the procedure of the two is equal to the impossibility of being entirely dependent on other symbolic games, which makes it an absolute. Since the amazing variety of games is similar in some of its rules, if so, then it does not mean that the rules surround the language games completely, as the programming claims!! So; the possibility of conditional context limited in the case of partial inclusion of following and not in the case of the total inclusion of programming, which requires a multiplicity of the purposes of the actor in following the rules and then non-multi-purpose in the case of programming, because when the part is equal to the whole, and the part is included to the whole If this is the case, does it not indicate that the rules are not programming accurate?! Because relations are inevitable, but if we consider that the rules are included in the identity of actions in part, it will only be conditional, as the concept of the condition shares with the concept of the partial in the need for others to achieve conditional, not half a category so unless they meet the elements that achieve the concept of category, which is also the concept of conditions, making the body a condition of the concept of the mind radically different from making a sufficient reason for it. Treating paradoxes as anomalies or mutations since programming rests on an evolutionary balance, Chomsky added that the concept of the infinite in causal adequacy is characterized by the same problems as the concept of the infinite in the German mathematician George Cantor, both of whom considered it an ontological concept and tried to quantify it in a theoretical order, which later led to the disruption of all logical systems based on this theoretical ground. * In a language game, the object is a base identifier to be understood, unlike programming that does not give the object an active role; since it is governed by the inevitability of its programming that separates the base from the speech. Unlike the concept of following that makes the object embedded in the form of symbolic life, which requires that the meaning of a particular life is associated with the meaning of a particular language game, and the absence of a particular language game is dependent on the meaning of life in general. Agnosticism. What is needed from this abstinence is the impossibility of a theory called an "atheist life form"! * One of the conditions on which the concept of the image of life is based is that the human consciousness of the Intersubjectif self, and this is common between the two theories (following and programming) although they differ in its understanding and then employ it. Natural language games create the conjugational condition between the concepts of perception and belief, unlike programming that fabricates a causal relationship, and the atheist's denial of the possibility of unity of the arbitrary people preceded by the belief of religion in his language context? Does not mean that the language of religion? This is what I meant earlier in the possibility of calling the arbitrary language of the atheist "part of a game", and therefore of a life form, his language is conditional on the language of religion, and the only way to make the language of the atheist communicative is that the religious language is a condition or a rule for the introduction of atheism in natural language. In other words, the nature of the game is the movement provided by proofs and commitments as a structural origin of its concept, as the negation is not in itself nothing, and considering the context as secondary as when Ogden, Richards, Grace and others may theoretically agree with the hypothesis of the form of life of the atheist and his understanding of how his language develops, but to say that this contextuality prevents him from being atheistic, if the context is secondary, the understanding of the Buddhists would be rejected because it lacks the possibility. Here, an objector might say: How do you deduce the concept of context which is "relativistic" to prove an absolute command as "god"? The argument of relativity and multiplicity of contexts is an acknowledgment of the inadequacy of the human description of God without the aid of revelation, and not an acknowledgment of the relativity of God, because if the reality of God were relative, all possible life forms would be forbidden, because it is the primary condition for learning language since it is subjective, and not causally governed by innate rules, then there is a difference between the human description of God. The programmer remains absolutely ignorant about his perception of his genetic rules, unlike the one he sees as part of his logic game, which derives its meaning from the concept of his contextual life, because the change flips the perception and moves him between the family similarities of games and the paradoxes of natural language sees the diversity of variations as part of the games, unlike the programmer genetically prevents him from using them, how does the eye see itself without an external mirror! If the human type is programmed by rules of the world view. But the meditator notes that this participation, although different in its position within each theory, guarantees an understanding of "rules" as a form of tameness, in the sense that the quest to remove rules from the texture of games and their similarities to the rules of other games, is an attempt to describe the indescribable, and an attempt to overcome the indescribable; by making the rules all that there is. What does it mean to describe an image of life? The concept of the description needs to include and surround the description of a certain image of life to be seen from outside or to use rules other than the rules of life, but this paradoxical use of this image of life also lacks the undecidable rules - as demonstrated by Kurt G?del - and is also necessary for the concept of family similarity to these games, and this similarity is comprehensive and interacts with paradoxes. His investigations built a comprehensive theory, and he also rejected the concept of meta-language! One meaning of the above is that the existence of an “atheist life image” is forbidden since the content of the software itself is also forbidden, and what can be described in an atheist society outside the context of religion? Any description of contextual rules and conditions is required, and since religion is a rule and a condition for understanding the only possibility of an “atheist” life image, its exclusion as a condition requires to be understood. Although Godel and Wittgenstein are involved in introducing paradoxes into consciousness and its phenomena, or at least one of the ingredients of their theses, Godel’s incompleteness argument is based on the identity principle, which makes it different from the liar’s paradox, which adheres to a logical (honest-liar) duality, proving that the human self is not the same, and that seeing the ego ends in blindness if it tries to examine itself through it. * From the above we note that the need for the concept of following the rules of context to understand and build a solid experience or create other experiences does not require him to make the rules logical or genetic, the realization of the regression within the paradox of identity necessary for the proof of incompleteness highlights that the rules are not rules in the sense of Chomsky. Chomsky, a kind of reduction of all symbolic experiences to a solid subjective state, which in turn requires them to be subjected to the impact of the lessons of the mind. This view revisits the problem of categories raised in the mathematical logic by Bertrand Russell in the early 20th century, but on the scale of re-conceptualization of identity rather than the problem of group membership, and the recognition that the influence of lessons in the innateness of rules is an inevitable paradox, and its recognition within the symbolic system of Chomsky does not exclude the difference I mentioned in the previous paragraph that the same context between Godel and Wittgenstein that the second uses the same principle of lessons. This makes contextual positivism the origin of any symbolic game, other than contextualism, which it sees as a matter of dimension or secondary, and added that the concept of paradox according to the meaning of gentgenstein opens up to other symbolic game worlds; since the concepts of paradox and family similarity touch, and this petition confirms that the use of rules Gentgenstein is not subject to the influence of the rules, which requires a solid subjective state, and thus the paradoxes arising from family similarities! One important difference between the theory of Gtgenstein and the theory of Chomsky is that the second seeks by making the rules of the theory of the natural subject, the formation of an explanatory theory, and this makes it separate between the symbolic experience and its rules, which also requires the separation of the concepts of perception and belief, as if the concept of perception is neutral to the theory of some theory. He who considers the relationship between the two concepts of perception and belief, which he sees that they end on the role of conditional coupling is inseparable between them. Although this relationship contains a paradox, it is the paradoxes within any theory that require us to regard rules as part of the symbolic experience and not separate from them, because there is no theory without paradoxes; since the phenomena of human consciousness are not without them as well, instead of dealing with them with the "Occam blade" desire to make a clear theoretical distinction between conventions and symbols, the concept of the paradox should be environment within the relationship of the concepts of perception and belief provided by natural language. Chomsky's separation of the concepts of "causal adequacy" and "code-experience poverty" is similar to that of logical positivists in their separation of the concepts of "analytical" and "synthetic" across the "verification" interval, but Chomsky makes the distinction between rules and symbols as irrational as the positivists. Within the framework of this artificial separation between perception and belief, we recall the criticism of the American philosopher Willard Van Quine of the problem of the concepts of analytical and synthetic, his theory of the ontological commitment adopted by language in mental perception, makes speakers of a particular language differ among themselves in the linguistic "return" of words to reality, which requires unclear designation or Distinction between the significance of the mental commitment to the ontology of a language and its actual significance in reality. Despite the strength of Quine's critique of the imaginary synthesis between perception and belief, he sees the importance of the methodology of natural science as relatively neutral, as his criticism of the "no-needs" is limited to the border areas and crosses the areas of ambiguity (and at the top of their list; Bart Kosko, Quine's duality works well for parties to equations other than sharing areas, which, Quine says, requires us to reconsider that relationship. For his part, however, this limitation, as his criticism is limited to criticism of the border areas and participation without all the areas of consciousness and its phenomena, leads him to the same paradoxes in which others have occurred. Criticism of the theory of the “unappointed” in Quine, also represents criticism of the conditional separation between symbols and their rules. Is the symbolic experience poor? This claim is based on the poverty of experience, as in Chomsky, on the assumption that it is separated from the rules. If the rules were part of the games, they would not be poor, because the language games contain paradoxes in their texture; since they are family-like with each other, as we have already explained. I should add that this claim is based on the artificial difference between the perception and the truth we have discussed in the previous paragraph, but it should be noted that Chomsky is lexical. In conclusion, we emphasize the refrain with which we began our article in assuming the theoretical possibility of an image of an “atheist” life for the above considerations, and because any attempt to fabricate an all-explaining theory of the amazing diversity of human action is precisely an attempt to create an “artificial” that fabricates the “above-the-fact” world as expressed by von Baudrillard, which makes us believe something scientific or the methodology of an action. Peace be upon those who follow the guidance. References: (1) Tginstein, author: Hans Sluga, translated by Dr. Salah Ismail, National Center for Translation, 2014. (2) Obstetric Linguistics (From Interpretation to Beyond Interpretation) by Noam Chomsky, translated by Mohammed Rahali, United New Book House, 2013. (3) Flexible thinking (the new science of flexible logic), authored by Bart Cusco, translated by Dr. Asaad Al-Janabi, Dar Aladdin Publications, 2nd edition 2015. (4) Artificial and artificial, authored by: Jean Baudrillard, translated by Dr. Joseph Abdullah, Arab Organization for Translation, 2008. Margins: 1 In paragraph 580 of his book Philosophical Investigations. (2) This is because the concept of the mind for them is due to tribalism or an ideal outside the context of human society, and this is undoubtedly due to their saying of dualism (mind/body). (3) Wittgenstein, L. (1960) Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus, London, p. 183. Translation: Abdullah bin Said al-Shehri, "Three Messages in Atheism, Reason and Faith," i 2, p 163. Sultan al - Banawi — Source: Brahin Center website - Posted on 2016-08-05 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/philosophy/مجتمع-الإلحاد-بين-ڤتجنشتاين-وتشومسكي