Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (3)

Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (3) * Note: This series is from the book (Human Consensus) For more please see the book. C. The Popper Model: After giving his critique of logical positivism and its method of verification of statements, Popper "made it clear that scientific theories may come in any way, just as the artistic idea, myth, or myth comes in any way, but what distinguishes science from any other mental activity is its continued falsifiability by empirical experience." In Popper's view, metaphysics has a meaning unlike positivists. Antiquated metaphysical theories were views of the natures of things as well as physical theories, but the difference is that scientific theories can be falsified. Popper uses metaphysics as a productive fiction for future physical theories. The aim of Popper's re-examination of metaphysics is also science, or, in his words, a critique of the principle of the possibility of realisation has always been this: what is taken to be the aim pursued by the proponents of this principle is that the use of this principle as a criterion will not exclude most important scientific issues, i.e., exclude scientific theories and the general laws of nature. Any descriptive sentence to be "boiling water at a certain temperature" necessarily contains a general description, the faculties contained in the phrase as the word "water" cannot be verified, despite the simplicity of the case mentioned, and regardless of the pragmatic use and use of metaphysics in the service of science, but Popper's criticism of regional positivists in their exclusion of metaphysics was mostly correct and influential. For Popper, the validity of the phrase depends on whether it can be falsified and compared to practical experiments, rather than on verification, or, in his words, "In order for issues or patterns of issues to reach the rank of science, they must be able to conflict with possible observations or observations that can be imagined".[3] Although logical positivism and Popper are tried in reality, but there is a big difference between them, for example, positivism makes the mind a white page. What concerns us here is that Popper based his scientific theory and his theory of knowledge on the idea of natural selection, reality will constantly correct what suits him, and that the organism is equipped with pre-existing hypotheses to deal with reality, Popperism represents a special kind of rationality, instead of Descartes' spiritual rationality or Plato's ideal rationality we are in front of a genetic rationality programming, and this is the rationality of the twentieth century, and its features are very visible in the "ling system" in Chomsky. But when we say that Popper's theory of knowledge is Darwinian, there is necessarily no absolute validity and no absolute lie to a phrase or theory, as well as all theories of science contribute to the development of science and if you lie, as the development of a part in Darwinism contributes to the general structure of the organism and if Aadmer, " Popper believes that each theory should retain its place in the history of science, so as long as it has helped to progress, then it may have contributed to our science today. Conclusion After this brief presentation of the most famous philosophies of science, and the extent of certainty and justification in science, we can make a comparison between the justification of the scientific community and the justification of the human consensus as follows: The agreement of human societies in certain psychological, linguistic and social buildings that the world looks at does not express a whim or prejudice, and most importantly that the norms of the rules do not conflict as long as they are original conditions in the game (image) of life [5], but it is the image of human life without any falsification, or agreements that define the structure of man: physical, social and psychological. Justification in human buildings is among itself, while in experimental science it needs to be proven, for which there is no absolute certainty, "Thomas Kuhn (and others) did not offer an acceptable or unacceptable means of reaching agreement with the scientific community."[6] Having been unable to reach a collective agreement and to determine what science is out of superstition, what justification makes science superior to other fields of research? The human language is acquired on the social, psychological and material level, while the scientific language is acquired at a level where the material part is very much superior, and this does not mean that the scientific community does not intervene in the formulation of scientific language, but the impact is fixed as I mentioned, but there is great care Of course, on materialism, which is certainly useful, but scientific language has no right to underestimate the initial experience if it is acquired at the psychological and social level (such as the old belief in the centrality of the earth through the consideration of man's self-worth), and physically lied (such as the rotation of the earth around the sun and its small size relative to the universe), for all its contexts. The innate human commons must be completely discredited by empirical science for its preconceptions and for previous reasons of justification and others. "Science does not always follow the linear growth of objective knowledge, but rather a social, cultural and historical practice, knowledge always existing in a given situation, and what is considered knowledge may depend on matters of power and influence." [1] Popper's Philosophy, Al-Kholy, p.339. [2] Metaphysical Foundations of Science, p. [3] Ibid., p. 82. [4] Ibid., p. 89. [5] The difference between societies is not in the necessary form of life, but in the subcategories of communication, despite their different language games, because there is a game or buildings mental, psychological, linguistic or social in general. [6] Theories of Science, p. [7] George Laikoff, Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, New Book House, translated by Abdul Majid Juha, p. - Reza Zeidan. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published on 2018-01-15 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/science-scientism/مقارنة-حجية-الإجماع-بين-الجماعة-العلمية-والجماعة-البشرية-3