Critical assessment of Dawkins, Dennett, Lewis, Wolbert, Harris, and Westinger (2)

Critical assessment of Dawkins, Dennett, Lewis, Wolbert, Harris, and Westinger (2) This series is from the first supplement of the book (There is a God: How the World's Most Powerful Atheist Changed His Thoughts?) For more see the book. Life. The next phenomenon to consider is life. Because of Anthony Flew’s treatment of this issue in this book, there is no need to dwell further on the question of the origin of life. It should be noted, however, that current debates on the issue do not seem to be informed by major issues. These organisms are active, goal-oriented, self-replicating, and semiotically oriented entities (their existence depends on the mutual interaction between codes and chemistry). Each individual organism has the ability to act, each being is the unifying and central source of all its actions. Since these entities are able to survive and act independently, and their actions are somehow motivated by ends (such as nutrition), they can reproduce themselves: they are functionally independent, self-replicating, purpose-driven entities. Pattee suggests that there can be interactions and reciprocal effects between chemical processes in organisms (controls, codes, languages, information, organization) and physical systems (laws, dynamics, energy, forces, and matter). While Wolpert was quite frank about the current state of the field of research, “this does not mean that all the scientific questions relating to evolution have been solved. Quite the contrary, we still have a limited understanding of the very question of the origin of life and the development of the amazing cell from which all living things originated.”7 As for Dennett, in his earlier books, he simply took it to be true that some materialist accounts are true. Unfortunately, even at the physicochemical level, Dawkins’s approach is crudely inadequate or perhaps even worse. “But how does life begin?” asks Dawkins. “The origin of life is that chemical event, or chain of chemical events, by which the biological conditions for natural selection are created for the first time...and once the biological element, some kind of genetic molecule, is in place, Darwinian natural selection follows and its action begins.”8 Such a kind of inference, best described as a reckless exercise in myth, is that if we want anything to happen somewhere, we need only "call the magic of large numbers." The white unicorn or the elixir of life, even if they are "shockingly predictable" planets, are inevitable "in contradiction to all the axioms." Awareness Fortunately, things aren't so bad about consciousness research. Today there is a growing awareness of the nature of consciousness. We are aware, and we are fully aware that we are aware. No one can deny this without contradicting the intrinsic and those of the brain, although some continue to do so. The problem becomes unsolved, when we realize the nature of neurons. First of all, neurons have nothing in common with our conscious life. Second, and most importantly, the physical properties of neurons do not give any indication of the potential of the brain to believe that they have the ability to create consciousness. There is a blind belief, without foundation, behind the claim that parts of matter are capable of “synthesizing” a new reality that bears no resemblance to that substance. Although the general trend of mind-body research now acknowledges the reality of consciousness and the consequent mystery, Daniel Dennett is one of the few remaining philosophers who continues to elude the obvious. The question of whether something is “already conscious” is not interesting or even responsible, while asserting that machines can be conscious because we are essentially conscious machines! Daniel Dennett’s interpretation of consciousness is functionalism, which is to say that we do not have to go about what makes up the so-called mental phenomenon. Instead, we should explore and examine the functions that these phenomena perform. Pain is something that generates an avoidance reaction, and thought is an action taken in the problem-solving process; it is not a special event located in a special place, and the same is true of all other supposed mental phenomena. But what this view omits is the fact that all mental actions are always associated with states of consciousness, states in which we are fully aware of what we are doing, and there is no way that functionalism can explain or claim to explain the state of consciousness, or explain the state of perception, or explain the state of our ability to know exactly what we think (a computer, for example, does not "know" what it does). What's really interesting is that Dennett's critics and the principle of functionalism are proponents of physicalism; David Papineau and John Searle. John Searle was particularly clear: "If you are seduced by the principle of functionalism, I'm sure you don't need to refute it. Unlike Dennett, Sam Harris vigorously defends the superphysical truth of consciousness, stating that "the dilemma is that the brain, when viewed as a physical system, does not contain anything that indicates that it is the bearer of that unfamiliar inner dimension, which each of us experiences as uniquely perceptual." He then surprises us by saying, "Perhaps consciousness is a much more primitive phenomenon than other living creatures with their brains. To Dawkins’s credit, he acknowledged the truth of perception and language and the dilemma that ensued. He once said, “Neither I nor Stephen Pinker can explain human self-awareness; that is, explain what philosophers call qualia,” and he also said, “How the Mind Works is elegantly avoided, and where it comes from.” [*] Qualia in philosophy is the quality or state that is seen in the state of consciousness of the qualities of things from a subjective perspective. The concept of the perceived quality is an important and thorny topic in philosophy, due to the fact that perceptual perception varies in comparison to individual cases. Understanding the perceived quality is one of the fundamental topics in the philosophy of mind. 6. Howard H. Pattee, “The Physics of Symbols: Bridging the Epistemic Cut,” Biosystems 60 (2001): 5–21. 7. Lewis Wolpert, Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), 212–13. 8. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam, 2006), 137. 9. Dawkins, The God Delusion, 137–38. 10. John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 9. 11. Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York: Norton, 2004), 208–9. 12. Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker, “Is Science Killing the Soul?” The Guardian-Dillons Debate, Edge 53 (April 8, 1999). 13. Wolpert, Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 78. - Roy Abraham Fargis. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published 2018-05-30 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/philosophy/تقييم-نقدي-لدوكينز-ودينيت-ولويس-وولبرت-وهاريس-وستنجر-2