Neuroethics: A Critique of the Cognitive Neuroscience of Ethics - Author's Introduction

Neuroethics: A Critique of the Cognitive Neuroscience of Ethics - Author's Introduction Why this book?! The human soul has occupied the Greek philosophers and modernists from various motives, and in terms of nature many philosophers have seen that man has two existential natures, the immaterial soul and the physical body, whether for the cognitive or moral excellence of man or for the philosophical construction from which the philosopher who is influenced by many contextual factors started. Other philosophers have asserted that there is only matter or the body, and therefore have interpreted knowledge and the human will embodied. The debate in contemporary thought has shifted from the relation of the mind to the brain, and the possibility of replacing the mind (the immaterial aspect) with the brain, i.e. that the debate is related to the physics of the mind, and we are in front of two different models of man, the first: man as the son of a certain historical and cultural nature is gradually modified but does not accept Darwinian emanation from an inferior animal, and that this nature justifies him to conduct. He who defends the first model with its rich dimensions and elements is more likely to accept a spiritual interpretation of man, and is also logically accepted by those who see man as consisting only of material to see in his behavior dimensions that cannot be reduced and explained physically, and the philosopher Hilary Putnam an important article – after his repudiation of the reductionist materialism that he embraced previously – can be linked to the philosophy and our mental life of the physical universe of denial in 1975. Therefore, considering that man is composed of body and spirit is quite different from saying that man has social, historical and cultural dimensions and components that cannot be explained scientifically reductively, the latter is what we establish, and we recognize that sociology and psychology have their own laws that cannot be reducible to biological or neurological laws. In this paper we will not seek to prove that man has two different, existential natures; we will not mention, for example, research that supports the dualistic orientation of some neuroscientists, especially first generation scientists, such as the famous British neuroscientist Charles Sherrington's research that saw the mind transcend physical and chemical laws, or the studies of John Eckles that argues that the physical interpretation of human behavior is incomplete, and such studies. This is effectively the former question of any other branch as possible dualism or otherwise, which is, as John Searle puts it, "the central question in philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first century," and in his formulation, "how do we explain the pre-eminent existence of man as a conscious, responsible, free, rational, speaking, social, and political person in a world entirely made up, in the words of science, of mindless, meaningless material particles?" The aim of this research is to show that the alternative to the dualist view of man is not materialism and reductionism. There is another descriptive alternative that we will present that allows us to view ourselves as subjects of free will and moral worldview, regardless of the nature of man, whether bilateral or unilateral. [1] Sergio Moravia, 1995, The Mystery of Mind: The Problem of Mind and Body in Contemporary Thought, Damascus Publications and Culture Minister, translated by Adnan Hassan, p.15. [2] John Searle, 2004, Mind: A Brief Introduction, The World of Knowledge, translated by Michelle Hanna Matthias, p. - Reza Zeidan. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published on 2018-08-20 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/publications/intros/الأخلاق-العصبية-نقد-اختزال-علم-الأعصاب-المعرفي-للأخلاق-مقدمة-المؤلف