The fallacy of neuroethics.

The fallacy of neuroethics. *Note: This article is from Neuroethics: A Critique of the Cognitive Neuroscience of Ethics. The scientific view has dominated our perceptions a lot, and considered the scientific talk or the scientific view is the only one that is correct about the world, because "under the influence of contemporary science we are prone to become radical physicists if we are very inclined to unilateralism and simplicity, and do not want to accept a dualistic or pluralist view of things".[1] There are many statements from specialists throughout the 20th century that move the same color of them, and we are satisfied with the British astronomer Arthur Eddington saying: "The perception of the average man of the table is different from the whole." A radical position that excludes ordinary talk about things in favor of scientific talk about them, and more radical and explicit than Rorty's position, which we have quoted likening sensations to goblins, which must be abandoned by scientific payloads, but if Rorty is told that the concept of "table" must be removed since science tells us that it is only a collection of cognitive particles, he will say that it is "tremendously inappropriate to do so",[3] which is not a pragmatic answer, making the ordinary man's sense. The same rigid position I want to apply to psychology from exclusionary materialism and similar views that are based on a monolithic scientific view, where you see the possibility of access to the mind with the physical method, and you hope that someday science will reach this active brain, these structures that the world says and talks about. This is the dominant perception and methodology in the interpretation of free human behavior, whether linguistically or morally, and this is true of Wittgenstein's statement: "Philosophists constantly see the method of science before their eyes." In principle, exclusionary materialism "mischaracterizes" psychological [and moral] concepts, "in describing them as rational by reasoning that would be a scientific theory", it makes psychological concepts that are a mode of speech justified by a society that justifies our knowledge a scientific theory, and this is a significant taxonomic confusion, on the one hand, "when we describe beliefs and desires to people and try to understand their behavior in terms of having the same mental states as we do nothing at all scientists do when interpreting the movements of large bodies of reasoning." When the body behaves according to mechanical laws, it does not behave in these ways because it has reasons for this behavior, but rational explanations are subject to normative limitations, contrary to the explanations of natural science. The rules are the criteria that may govern the reasons for the rational actor to act well or poorly, and it is clear that there is no relationship between these rules and purely physical explanations of the phenomena, we do not blame the rational method because it has fallen and we do not praise the sun because it shines culturally every day. We know that someone is morally responsible by observing their behavior, judging it to be sane, and so on, and according to our descriptive approach, "it is utterly unlawful to acknowledge the cognitive existence of something without regard for the linguistic forms by which it is discovered."[6] In short, "these modes of thought are not seen as a primitive scientific theory of human behavior, but as part of the meaning of the end of being human, they are not man-made patterns that are indispensable, but a partial formation of our humanity itself."[7] The inability of materialism to explain the mental and moral pattern has been recognized by many on materialism, for example Putnam says: "The doctrine shared by most philosophers of science (and shared for many years) I argue that this doctrine is wrong."[8] John Searle argues, "Although materialists are half-convinced by a religious belief that their view must be true, they have never succeeded in formulating a satisfactory formulation of it [i.e., materialism] that can be accepted by other philosophers in general, even by other materialists," and believes that the reason for this failure is that "they have always faced the obvious fact that different forms of materialism ignore a certain intrinsic mental quality of the universe that we know to be expressed independently of our own belief."[9] On the other hand, the language of experimental science is derived from ordinary language, and the nullification of the pattern of a certain speech such as mental or moral, as Rorty did, requires the nullification of all ordinary language, as Eddington has committed to do (though this is not really the case). If descriptive concepts such as color concepts are said to be objective while moral concepts are said to be defined by a certain range of colors, and we believe that this range does not necessarily reflect the nature of things themselves. This objection is based on a reflexive theory of knowledge, which makes things (physics) the first and last word in the formation of our humanity, while the same is true according to the descriptive approach we have presented, and the burden of proof falls on those who say the theory of reflexivity; the descriptive approach collected the following compound: language and behavior practiced by human groups and the agreement in the physical structure, but the reflexive and innate theories are content with the physical structure and the environment, and it is responsible for us to prove that the existence of this structure. Physiological talk about the world has no cognitive advantage over any other talk, "Physical language in Wittgenstein's view cannot claim to serve as an absolute model of human cognitive experience"[12], because every talk about the world has a method of verification and acceptance different from other talk, and even scientific talk itself can be said to have internal patterns, for example, the famous response of chemistry to physics "is not a complete answer, and it is very likely that some of its own properties. However, we can in no way claim that all or most of the properties of chemical compounds can be traced back to the atomic theory, even if what might be called a "principle response" to chemistry to physics strongly suggests this. We return to the reduction or elimination of the mental in favor of the physical. Talking about the mental from the physical is logically different, because "if you describe a phenomenon on the one hand as "emotional" and on the other hand as "a discharge of the adrenaline charge", I produce two linguistic and descriptive statements that are cognitive, different from each other, and each of them may have been providing certain information that the other does not, hence the advantage of maintaining the independence of each of each person."[14] Here we enter the center of the fallacy of neuroscience and cognitive science, which is the reduction of the phrase: (Mohammed Weber his parents) in the sentence (the brain contains neural patterns that carry us on the parents' righteousness - the result of evolutionary factors and the like -), which is a clear reduction of complex justifications in physical reasons stored in the brain, and what we said in our descriptive report is enough to respond to this, but the British philosopher specialized in Wittgenstein Peter Hacker The following explanation Cognitive neuroscience assumes that the brain has certain cognitive, cognitive, and moral abilities. We have the brain that thinks, thinks, interprets, and experiences things, and this is apparent in the slightest reflection on the work of Antonio da Maceo and Sam Harris, for example. "Our brains can often decide well in seconds or minutes, depending on the time frame we set for achieving the goal we want, and if they can't simply think, they must do a great job," said da Maceo. Even free will is not in harmony with subjective truths about us, and introspection is evident as opposed to this idea and the laws of physics. Acts of will only arise spontaneously (being causative, noncausative, or potentially perverse does not affect), and their origin cannot be traced in our conscious minds. One or two minutes of self-observation and you will notice that you have no more to decide than the next idea I am going to write."[17] [PI 281] [18], says Wittgenstein's Norman Malcolm: "Can the brain have thoughts, illusions, or pains? The meaning of this assumption is so obvious that I find it difficult to take it seriously, no experiment has been able to prove this result for the brain, why not? The main reason is that the brain is not sufficiently similar to the human being."[19] The psychic mobiles can be attributed only to man and those who behave like man. The neurocognitive sciences treat the brain the same as Descartes treats the non-material essence, both of which are outside the normal use of psychological loads, since we attribute them to the person and not to something of his body (even if it is the necessary condition for the thought process) or to the non-material essence, and here we find that the metaphysical dualism outside the normal concept of man and the reductive materialistic vision outside the normal concept of man share the same metaphysical vision, which we do not! The descriptive method says that the average person distinguishes between the mental and the person, "it is not the act of the mind that makes sense, it is the person who makes sense."[20] When I speak of any physical organ that replaces the person, I neglect all the common human behavior of the action (the social inheritance that we have shown to be the creator of cognition), deny my will, deny my own social and psychological experiences, and "when I am hurt, hopeful, or determined, I do not express certain truths that I am real." Or the innate person and the psychological payloads, thus addressing all neural problems related to free will[22] as we echo biological problems from a gene-centric perspective in our book "Critique of Evolutionary Morality". It is necessary to know here that cognitive neuroscientists do not mean the word "brain" for humans as we sometimes do or use it metaphorically, and if they want to, there will be no problem, because in this case they are looking at the condition necessary to produce human knowledge as any physical condition to make a move. The ruler in the use of the word brain neurologist is its practices with its use, so if he says the word short or uses it privately, the brain will not act as the real actor, but the owner of this. [1] Karl Popper, The Self and Its Brain, A Vision for Publishing and Distribution, translated by Adel Mustafa, p. [2] Zidane, Theory of Knowledge, p. [3] Moravia, The Mystery of the Mind, p 172. [4] Magin, Wittgenstein and Philosophical Research p. [5] Lowe, E. Jonathan (2000). P65. [6] Moravia, The Mystery of the Mind, p.249. [7] Lowe, E. Jonathan (2000). P66. [8] Moravia, The Mystery of the Mind, p. [9] Ibid. p. 46. [10] Ibid., p. 188. [11] Ibid. p. 220. [12] Ibid., p. 250. [13] Popper, The Self and Its Brain, p. [14] Moravia, The Mystery of the Mind 269. [15] Bennett, M. R. & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Hoboken, NJ, Blackwell). Ch3. [16] Antonio Damasio (1995), Descartes' Error: Emotions, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: HarperCollins), p172. [17] Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012), 5–6. [18] Influenced by Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty argues that since we can perceive social union as a source of cognitive power, "even the conceptual and linguistic knowledge of what is the first sense (the raw) is attributed to any beings on the basis of their possible membership in this social union, children and types of animals are more attractive to have sensations, not just a response to stimuli such as photoelectric cells and animals that do not feel sensations. And the minus knows what is pain and what is red, not what is the movement of the particles or what changes the seasons, is just to say that we can directly imagine and imagine the machines open their mouths and make a note on the first case and not on the second case. And to say that we (a machine composed of an electro-graphic cell tightly tied to a recording machine) says (red) When we say red light on it does not know what red days mean, we can not directly imagine the continuation of the conversation. “If we know a lot about how these things are made, we’d hate to think they’re potential partners.” Richard Rorty, 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Arab Organization for Translation, translated by Haidar Haj Ismail, pp. 270. What I want with this transposition is not to acknowledge the existence of a prior consciousness of language in any sense, but to say that even this social consciousness that is closest to emotion and tends to the biological side is extremely difficult to study man "inside" away from his society, so what is the case and the real human consciousness is complex and diverse life forms, and conceptual (linguistic and social) at its origin? [19] Moravia, The Mystery of the Mind, p. [20] Ibid., p. 62. [21] Ibid., p. 335. One of the most famous experiments, usually conceived as a critique of the concept of free will, was Benjamin Lippitt's 1985 experiment, which asked whether bending one's wrist automatically was a conscious decision or an unconscious brain process, so participants in his experiment were asked to bend their wrist at least 40 times at the times they wanted to and measured three things: It was the act (by placing electrodes on the wrist), the time when brain activity (using electrodes on the scalp) began in the motor cortex, and the time when the conscious decision was made to actually do so. The problem with this last time is that if you ask participants to shout, press a button, or do anything else, there will be another delay before the new action occurs, as with the wrist flexion. The decision to scream may interfere with the basic decision that is measured, so Lippitt developed a special way to measure the "will", he put in front of the participants in his experiment a screen that shows a point in a circle like a clock, and then asked the participants to watch the clock and determine the location of the point when they decided to do the act. At the end of the action, they were able to indicate the location of the point at that important moment, which allowed Lipit to determine when they decided to actually do it. The question is: What happened first? Will or possibility of preparation? Lippitt discovered that the decision to actually do something happens about 200 milliseconds before the action, but the possibility of preparation preceded it by about 350 milliseconds, which is about 550 milliseconds before actually doing it, in other words, the brain processes that plan the movement begin more than a third of a second before the person has the conscious desire to move. There have been many complex debates about the experiment, including questioning the method of experimenting and measuring and generalizing the results: a movement such as moving the wrist can never be compared to a complex moral act, for example. It should be noted that Lippitt did not see that free will is an illusion, but saw his experiences compatible with free will, nervous readiness before performing an action alone does not mean that we will actually do this action, and subsequent research has shown that even after releasing the standby effort we have the ability to reject the action triggered by the standby effort on the other hand. - Reza Zeidan. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published 2019-07-01 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/mind-neuroscience/مغالطة-الأخلاق-العصبية