Does experimental science give definite knowledge?

Does experimental science give definite knowledge? A Comparison of Nature and Science After presenting this criterion for correct human habits, we should compare the level of justification for the correct human habit and the level of justification for science, and here we have pushed the suspicions on the nature, let's look at the level of rationalization of the scientific community, is science advancing? Is science certain? Is the scientific community agreement an argument? This will be shown by presenting programs for the nature of science and certainty in it, and I will limit myself to three models - and they are the most important - during this part, the model of Karl Popper and the model. The Thomas Kuhn model and the Feyerabend model do not even acknowledge scientific progress, on a detail in the degree of negation, but the Bubry model, although it recognizes scientific progress through continuous falsification, but denies the existence of complete falsification, there is no certainty in scientific research for Bubber at all, so there was agitation against the three within some scientific circles, for example, some physicists discussed the extent of the influence of the three opinions in reducing the funding of scientific projects, with growing doubts about the value of scientific research. We draw the reader's attention to the fact that these three are the most famous and influential in the philosophy of science. The Thomas Cohn Model: Thomas Kuhn realized the fallacy of logical positivism or empiricism towards induction and fallacy of utopianism, and realized that various theories of science could not withstand historical analysis, so he simplified the universe of his theory through harmony with historical facts, and Thomas Kuhn presented his very important work in the history of the philosophy of science, the "structure of scientific revolutions" in 1962, and Thomas Kuhn's unique interest in the sociological characteristics of the scientific community.[2] The basic premises of the cosmological model are: Science is changed by the scientific community, united by the same traditions and rules derived from a single world view. The beginning of change in science is a new view of the world. Science evolves in the form of successive qualitative revolutions, and each revolution has its own paradigm, derived from a new view of the world, and embodied in the collective mind (i.e. the scientific community). Science is historical, and results from crises in scientific activity similar to what happens in socio-political work, and the crisis occurs when workers in the field of knowledge are surprised by an unexpected phenomenon, which normative science can not explain. Thomas Kuhn defines normative science as: research firmly founded on one or more previous scientific achievements, which a scientific complex considers to be the basis for its scientific practice.[4] Normative science is the laws, theories, applications, and traditions adhered to by the scientific community, and serves as the entry point and determinant for new scientific members. Believers in this normative science are divided during the crisis and the emergence of a new paradigm into two categories, one that retains the normative science and another that transforms into the new outlook, and often dominates the new outlook, but the importance of normative science lies in the organization of science, and its qualitative leaps, and this Qun cites Francis Bacon: The truth is born of error, not chaos. The task of researchers in the period of normative science is to develop it, and to see experiments through it as a rule of thumb (note that the observation, experiment, or sensibilities here are burdened by these rules[6]), and trust in the Bradym is impaired if the question marks increase and the anomaly increases and this guiding model is abandoned in favor of another Bradym. The emergence of problems is what causes creativity and radical change, and these problems are a basic task for the researcher during ordinary science as well, the researcher is working to solve puzzles according to the method of the guiding model, and the author concludes the fourth chapter in his book with a famous analogy shows this, which is the consideration of normative science is the chess puzzles that the player thinks about under the laws of chess, revolutions are the change of the laws themselves. In the sixth chapter, the author talks about scientific surprises, as scientific research in its history often faces sudden incidents, which serve as a catalyst or catalyst for the emergence of new Bradym. We can sum up his book in that science goes as follows: Prescience, then science, then normative science, then crisis, then revolution, then new normative science, and so on. The first stage is the pre-paradigm phase, in which scientists in a particular field are divided over theories that are valid to explain a particular phenomenon, and therefore there are several theories that are incompatible with each other, and scientists research according to them. Over time, these scientists gradually begin to gather around one of these intellectual frameworks, which they see as more suitable than the rest in the interpretation of scientific phenomena, and increasing interest in it without others until reaching a general acceptance of this framework with its terms, research methods and concepts, and here turns this theory to Pradem. This group of researchers then becomes independent scientific practitioners or scholars, thus creating their own journals, societies and schools. Achievements that this scientific community sees at a given moment as forming the basis of its scientific and research practices are also incorporated into textbooks and textbooks, and are re-taught as a whole, focusing on their explanatory capacity and on points that they have been able to explain, regardless of the aspects of their shortcomings and the circumstances of their origin. The second stage: the ordinary science stage, where most scientists are conservative people who accept the prevailing scientific framework that exists at a given moment, and seek to apply what they have learned in solving problems that this science has not yet been able to solve, and they persevere in this endeavor with determination and perseverance because of the confidence resulting from the successes they have studied and the consensus prevailing among researchers in this area. Here, scientific research becomes more like a solution to puzzles, for the need for pre-defined rules must be followed to reach the expected solution, and with the passage of time and the development of science begins anomalies that can not be dealt with by ordinary science and the rules in it, that is, they do not agree with the model, and therefore researchers generally ignore or blame their scientific tools or make simple modifications to the model to be explained. The third stage: the crisis stage, when the number of anomalies continues to increase, scientific results are no longer compatible with the model, and therefore there is a need for a "scientific revolution" that replaces the prevailing baradim with a new baradim, at which point the accepted rules and foundations in this scientific field are examined, "a sudden new phenomenon in a game with a set of rules required by the formulation of another set of rules, and after the new group becomes part of science, the scientific field is no longer the scientific project for those specialists. A new model is developed, and as the new model stabilizes, scientists return to research at the stage of ordinary science and solve puzzles according to its rules.[8] The themes that concern us and are directly related to our search for rules are: What is the justification for turning mere theories into rules and guidelines? Kohn insists that the rules are not explicitly expressed as rules, and invokes the idea of "language games" and "family similarities" that Wittgenstein spoke of, the rules or conditions necessary and sufficient for an activity to be a game can not be declared, and when we try to do so we get steadily an activity that matches the definition of play, but we do not want to count it as such, or an activity that is excluded by the definition of play, but we want it to play. Thomas argues that the same is true of prescriptive models. When we try to find a specific explicit characteristic of a model in past science or present science, we always find an element within the model that violates that characteristic, but he asserts that this situation does not make the concept of the model completely worse, and a similar situation with respect to "play" does not undermine the legitimate use of the concept of play, and even in the absence of a distinct characteristic in full and explicit form, every teacher acquires his knowledge. If a researcher consistently solves problems of a single pattern and conducts experiments of a single pattern and is conducted by a teacher within a given model, he will be familiar with the methods and patterns of this model and will not be able to make a clear statement about the scientific methods and experiences he has acquired, such as the carpenter's inability to provide a full description of his experience or practical skill ... This does not mean that the man of science can not formulate the exact nature of the model, but it is necessary, as it is generated when another scientific model is known. This point is the center of Thomas Kuhn's book, because he has shown that the scientific community's justification of a scientific image as "Neutinistic" over another "Einstein" depends mainly on a social decision, which belongs to the scientific community, but this group is affected as any limited group by: Metaphysical, religious, and philosophical views, the most famous example being Einstein's "fabricated cosmological constant" to preserve his view of the universe, although his theory of relativity originally predicted cosmic expansion that opposed his vision. "We have to note that scientists are human beings,[12] which means that their judgment is biased, and perhaps their choice of problems is eccentric, and perhaps their evaluation of the evidence is wrong, and their self-identification of facts, and their motives are questionable, and perhaps their observations are distorted because of their values, but these factors can be overcome because science is a self-correcting social project([10]), but forgery is a big door, and many examples, and we will be here just one example of the nature of science. 2- There is no standard to provide a model on another, all scientific images of the universe are different games, and the rules of the game of football can not be applied to the rules of the basket, for example, or the expression "transition from one religion to another"([13]), which is a very accurate expression, because there is no logical argument purely proving the superiority of one model to another, making the man of science "forced by another" access to the new image of the world, but is faith, and depends on highly overlapping factors. These factors include: the simplicity of theory, the urgent social need, the ability to solve a particular kind of problem, etc. These factors occupy the field of "science sociology". We come here to an important question: Has Kohn succeeded in demonstrating that science is a higher cognitive activity than others? Alan Chalmers describes Cohn's position: that if science is supposed to be superior to other fields of research, it actually suggests that when a mental theory conflicts with science, we should change that theory, not the science to which it conflicts; that we should first assume that we have standards of plausibility independent of our understanding and awareness of what is essential to scientific progress is to open the door to imaginary paradise. It is merely an imposition for which there is no evidence, and this will be made explicit by the following model. Paul Veraband's model: If Thomas Kohn had admitted that the elevation of science from other human activities was merely a hypothesis after his inability to prove a criterion for progress, Fireband was courageous and did not favour a dogmatic hypothesis, one of the most influential and controversial philosophers of the 20th century, and has a great credit for Thomas Kohn and Emery Lakatosh in their philosophy, with his research on the idea of the impossibility of comparison. In his 1975 book Against Method, Fairaband presented a chaotic plan for science, which had been translated into seventeen languages by 1994 alone. This book has angered many scholars and philosophers alike, but it is agreed that Fairaband was a checker and an argumentator, albeit enveloping it in terms that would provoke most of his contemporaries. Feyerabend's book consists of two main parts: the first deals with epistemological and logical issues; the second deals with some of the political and social consequences of the first, which is rare for philosophers of science; you will not find in their writings a close connection between their philosophy and other fields as Feyerabend did.[15] Feyerabend begins his attack on traditional research methods in all its forms, which the philosophers of science have been promoting and trying to convince us that it is the difference between science and non-science, as science advances in their philosophy by collecting facts and then inferring theories from them, but this traditional answer to what the method looks like does not seem convincing to anyone, because theories are not required for facts in the strict logical sense, and does not fit the concept of support or reinforcement to defend the method of science. If so, what is the best approach to science in Fireband's view? What are the correct rules for it? Fireband shocks us by saying that science has no method of its own that distinguishes it from any other activity, or makes it more worthy of respect as offering true, honest knowledge. Feyerabend does not see the transgression or violation of the rules of the scientific method as accidental, or occurring in rare cases, nor is it the result of a lack of our knowledge or of something that can be remedied or overcome, but he sees the contrary, this transgression is necessary for the progress of science. He confirms this by saying: No matter how much the rules of the method by which the philosophers of science appear to us necessary and essential, there are always circumstances that require not only ignoring these rules but adopting their opposite.[18] He then gives several examples from the history of science to prove this, and says elsewhere: The idea that science can and should be organized according to fixed and universal rules is both utopian and deceptively bright. It is utopian because it involves an overly simple conception of the solutions to man's predispositions or abilities, about the conditions that encourage or cause them to grow, and it is deceptively glamorous in that the attempt to enforce these rules is only to the detriment of our humanity, and furthermore such an idea is harmful to science, because it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions that truly influence scientific change. His student Alan Chalmers agrees: [20] If we mean by the methods of science rules to guide the choices and decisions of those involved in science, we cannot but agree with Fireband, every scientific situation is realistic and complex, growing in an unpredictable way, so it is absurd to wish to find a method that can show the rational world in a given context whether to adopt theory X by rejecting theory Y or vice versa. Fireband negates the idea of the criterion of the scientific community in the first place, scientists only have to follow their imaginations or what seems to them important and exciting, and the reason for the invalidity of any criterion in his view that scientific activity is not a purely objective or rational activity, if scientific progress is the displacement of theories to be replaced by new theories, this process often includes elements "irrational" i.e. unjustified or justified, and this is evidenced by the following point: In order for logical positivism to overcome the subjectivity of science, Reichenbach made a preliminary distinction, followed by many, including Karl Popper, between the context of disclosure and the context of justification. The context of disclosure is about trying to discover rules, techniques, or means to uncover theories. The context of justification is concerned with objective principles to justify and evaluate competing theories in the light of available evidence. This distinction is one of the fundamental tenets of the Vienna Circle: there is a difference between tracing historical origins, psychological origin, and social and political conditions to the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories, and offering a logical reconstruction of conceptual construction and testing of scientific theories.[21] According to Feyerabend, the distinction between the context of disclosure and the context of justification is illusory, accepting the results of any practical experiment mixed with subjective elements and personal tendencies of the different group of scientists, and therefore the distinction between these two contexts is not real and artificial, as disclosure cannot be just a random blunder, and justification includes many subjective elements, in Feyerabend's words: The distinction between the context of disclosure and the context of justification is never real. We must not separate the physical sciences and the humanities and transcend the first over the second, complete objectivity is an illusion, and is the main reason why society looks at physical progress and does not feel progress in the humanities. If Thomas Kohn had made the scientific standard of progress the leaps between indicative models by being a transition from religion to religion within a psychological framework of the scientific community but largely governed by the rules agreed upon as a methodology: Fireband does not see this, and does not even care about rules at all, scientific reality is complicated because it is a human practice, in which man enters with his anarchism and overlapping patterns of behavior and decisions, and therefore no rules embedded in their scientific practice can be understood by the scientific community. Since science is a human practice, there is no room for preference over any other late practice, and Feyerabend complains that scientists often judge the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge without trying to figure out these latter forms in a precise way, but it is noted that Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn were greatly influenced by the idea of language games and images of life presented by Wittgenstein, but neither of them - and Wittgenstein also gave a specific way to evaluate gay games such as Astrology and others. Another point by which Feyerabend ends up being completely subjective is that of incomparability, one of the key points in his analysis of science, "If observation cannot be a priori the theory, and observation must take place within a given context in which the observation is to be interpreted, in some cases the basic principles of two competing theories may be so far apart that it is impossible even to formulate the principles of one theory in terms of another theory. It follows that the two competing theories do not share any of their own observations, nor is it possible because of this divergence between the principles of the two theories to make a logical conclusion to some of the results of one of the two theories from the principles of the competing theory, within the perspective of comparison between them, and therefore the two theories are not comparable.[23] To take an example presented by Fairaband to show his idea, which is the relationship between classical mechanics and the theory of relativity, the first physical subjects according to classical mechanics have a sense of form, mass and size, which are inherent and adjacent properties of physical subjects and can be modified as a result of a physical interaction, but in the theory of relativity will not be so, but these properties - form, mass and size - have become the meaning of relations between subjects and a particular reference system, and can be modified in the theory of relativity will not be so. The system of new concepts created by the theory of relativity not only denies the existence of classical states and facts, but even goes so far as to not allow us even to formulate words that express such states and facts; this system does not share with its predecessor even one operative, and cannot do so, always considering that we do not use theories as sketches or taxonomic diagrams to arrange neutral facts or phenomena. From this argument, Feyerabend then draws an extreme and highly subjective conclusion, namely, that the whole of science is self-governing the world, like aesthetic judgments, like taste, after failing to identify certain criteria by which to compare what is left in the evaluation is our "self-desires."[25] The second part of Feyerabend's book is about society, which is like warning against the domination of experimental science as an ideology, how science has become a religion, how scientific facts are indoctrinated in the same way as the facts of religion previously in Europe, and respect for the man of science is the same kind of respect that was given to the cleric. But Feyerabend did not offer an alternative to how to evaluate scientific theories, and this is a major problem in his philosophy, so that the solutions he offers have made a mockery of his entire philosophy, like the ballot boxes, that elections are held to vote on scientific theories! C-Model Popper: After giving his critique of logical positivism and its verifiability of statements, Popper "made it clear that scientific theories may come in any way, just as a technical idea, myth, or myth comes in any way, but what distinguishes science from any other mental activity is its continued falsifiability by empirical experience."[26] In Popper's view, metaphysics has a meaning unlike positivists. Antiquated metaphysical theories were views of the natures of things as well as physical theories, but the difference is that scientific theories can be falsified. Popper uses metaphysics as a productive fiction for future physical theories. The aim of Popper's re-examination of metaphysics is also science, or in his words: a critique of the principle of the possibility of realisation has always been this: what is taken to be the aim pursued by the proponents of this principle is that the use of this principle as a criterion will not exclude most important scientific issues, i.e., exclude scientific theories and general laws of nature.[27] Any descriptive sentence to be "boiling water at a certain temperature" necessarily contains a general description, the faculties contained in the phrase as the word "water" cannot be verified, despite the simplicity of the case mentioned, and regardless of the pragmatic use and use of metaphysics in the service of science, but Popper's criticism of regional positivists in their exclusion of metaphysics was mostly correct and influential. The validity of the phrase in Popper depends on the possibility of lying and comparing it to practical experiments, instead of relying on verification, or in his words "For issues or patterns of issues to reach the rank of science must be able to conflict with possible observations or observations can be imagined."[28] Despite the trial of logical positivism and Popper to reality, for example, there is a significant difference between them, but positivism makes the mind a white page is a statement is only extrapolation or observation of reality. What concerns us here is that Popper based his scientific theory and his theory of knowledge on the idea of natural selection, reality will constantly correct what suits him, and that the organism is equipped with pre-existing hypotheses to deal with reality, Popperism represents a special kind of rationality, instead of Descartes' spiritual rationality or Plato's ideal rationality we are in front of a genetic rationality programming, and this is the rationality of the twentieth century, and its features are very visible in the "ling system" in Chomsky. But when we say that Popper's theory of knowledge is Darwinian, there is necessarily no absolute truth and no absolute lie to a phrase or theory, as well as all the theories of science contribute to the development of science and if you lie, as the development of a part in Darwinism contributes to the general structure of the organism and if Aadmer, " Popper sees the need to keep every theory its place in the history of science, as long as it has helped to progress, so much as it has contributed to our science today." Dalton. Conclusion After this brief presentation of the most famous philosophies of science, and the extent of certainty and justification in science, we can make a comparison between the justification of the scientific community and the justification of the human consensus as follows: The agreement of human societies in certain psychological, linguistic and social buildings with which the world looks does not express a whim or prejudice, and most importantly that the norms of the rules do not conflict as long as they are original conditions in the game (image) of life[30], but it is the image of human life without any falsification or agreements, from which the structure of man is known; physical, social and psychological. Justification in human buildings is among itself, while in experimental science it needs to be proved, for which there is no absolute certainty, "Thomas Kohn (and others) have not provided an acceptable or unacceptable means of reaching agreement with the scientific community."[31] Having been unable to reach a collective agreement and to determine what science is out of superstition, what justification makes science superior to other fields of research? 2. The human language is acquired on the social, psychological and material level, while the scientific language is acquired at a level where the material part is very much superior, and this does not mean that the scientific community does not intervene in the formulation of the scientific language, but the impact is fixed as mentioned, but there is a keen interest, of course, on the material, which is certainly useful, but the scientific language has no right to underestimate the initial experience if it is acquired on the psychological and social level (such as the old belief of the centrality of the earth through the human consideration of the value of himself). The innate human commons must be completely discredited by empirical science for its preconceptions and for previous reasons of justification and others. “Science does not always follow the linear growth of objective knowledge, but rather a social, cultural and historical practice, knowledge always existing in a given situation, and what is considered knowledge may depend on matters of power and influence.” [1] 1987 article in Nature by two physicists entitled "Where the Science Gone Wrong". [2] Theories of Science, p. [3] Translator's Introduction to the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Arab Organization for Translation. [4] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. [5] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. [6] In chapter 3 of his book, Thomas Kohn gives several examples of the influence of observation on the model. [7] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. [8] This summary is published online, as part of a complete clearance of the book, for Maha Al-Jaris. [9] Theories of Science, p. [10] Man is the measure, p. ([11]) http://creation.com/haeckel-fraud-proven-part-2 [12] Such as Betrayers of the Truth, where authors William Broad and Nicholas Wade presented numerous examples of ancient and modern on deliberate falsification in science. [13] Theories of Science, p. [14] Theories of Science, pp. 13-14. [15] Three Conversations in Knowledge, p. [16] Ibid, p.11. [17] Ibid., p. [18] Ibid., p. [19] Theories of Science, 134-135. [20] Ibid., p. 135. [21] Three Conversations in Knowledge, p. [22] Three Conversations, p. [23] Theories of Science, p. [24] Ibid., p. 138. [25] Ibid., p. 138. [26] Popper's Philosophy, Al-Kholy, p.339. [27] The Metaphysical Foundations of Science, p. [28] Ibid., p. 82. [29] Ibid., p. 89. [30] The difference between societies is not in the necessary form of life, but in the subcategories, so communication has been done despite their different language games, because there is a game or mental, psychological, linguistic or social buildings in general. [31] Theories of Science, p. [32] George Laikoff, Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, New Book House, translation by Abdelmadjid Juha, p. - Center Management — Source: Brahin Center website - Published on 2019-12-09 (archived at the Internet Archive) http://braheen.com/mag/25-misc/99-es-certainty