Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (1)

Comparison of consensus authority: between the scientific community and the human community (1) * Note: This series is from the book (Human Consensus) For more please see the book. Is science my certainty? Is the agreement of the scientific community an argument? This will be shown by presenting programs for the nature and certainty of science, and I will limit myself to three models – the most important ones – Karl Popper’s model, Thomas Kuhn’s model and Paul Feyerabend’s model. The Thomas Kuhn model and the Fireband model do not even acknowledge scientific progress, on a detail in the degree of negation, and the Bubry model, although it recognizes scientific progress through constant falsification, but denies the existence of complete falsification, there is no certainty in scientific research in Bubbour at all, so there was agitation against the three within some scientific circles, for example, some physicists discussed the extent of the influence of the three opinions in reducing the funding of scientific projects, with growing doubts about the value of scientific research. We draw the reader's attention to the fact that these three are the most famous and influential in the philosophy of science. The Thomas Cohn Model: Thomas Kuhn realized the fallacy of logical positivism or empiricism towards induction and the insufficiency of propristic or philosophic tendencies, and realized that various theories of science could not withstand historical analysis, so he simplified the universe of his theory through harmony with historical facts, and Thomas Kuhn presented his very important work in the history of the philosophy of science, the "structure of scientific revolutions" in 1962, and the most important characteristic of Thomas Kuhn's research is his unique interest in the sociological characteristics of the scientific community. The basic premises of the cosmological model are: Science is changed by the scientific community, united by the same traditions and rules derived from a single world view. The beginning of change in science is a new view of the world. Science evolves in the form of successive qualitative revolutions, and each revolution has its own paradigm, derived from a new view of the world, and embodied in the collective mind (i.e. the scientific community). Science is historical, and results from crises in scientific activity similar to what happens in socio-political work, and the crisis occurs when workers in the field of knowledge are surprised by an unexpected phenomenon, which normative science can not explain. Thomas Kuhn defines normative science as: research firmly founded on one or more previous scientific achievements, which a scientific complex considers to be the basis for its scientific practice. Normative science is the laws, theories, applications, and traditions adhered to by the scientific community, and serves as the entry point and determinant for new scientific members. Believers in this normative science are divided during the crisis and the emergence of a new paradigm into two categories, one that retains the normative science and another that converts to the new view, and often dominates the new view, but the importance of normative science lies in the organization of science, and its qualitative leaps, and this Qun cites Francis Bacon: The truth is born of error and not chaos, without this organization there would have been no Brady in the first place, "so that a theory can be accepted, but that the theory must be confronted by the other." The task of researchers in the period of normative science is to develop it, and to see experiments through it as a rule of thumb (note that the observation, experiment, or sensibilities here are burdened with these rules), and trust in the Bradym is impaired if the question marks increase and the anomalies increase and this guiding model is abandoned in favor of another Bradym. The emergence of problems is what causes creativity and radical change, and these problems are a basic task for the researcher during ordinary science as well, the researcher is working to solve puzzles according to the method of the guiding model, and the author concludes the fourth chapter in his book with a famous analogy shows this, which is the consideration of normative science is the chess puzzles that the player thinks about under the laws of chess, revolutions are the change of the laws themselves. In the sixth chapter, the author talks about scientific surprises, as scientific research in its history often faces sudden incidents, which serve as a catalyst or catalyst for the emergence of new Bradym. We can sum up his book in that science goes as follows: Prescience, then science, then normative science, then crisis, then revolution, then new normative science, and so on. - The first stage: is the pre-paradigm stage, in which scientists in a particular field are divided on the theories valid to explain a particular phenomenon, and therefore there are several theories incompatible with each other, and scientists are researching according to them. Over time, these scientists gradually begin to gather around one of these intellectual frameworks, which they see as more suitable than the rest in the interpretation of scientific phenomena, and increasing interest in it without others until reaching a general acceptance of this framework with its terms, research methods and concepts, and here turns this theory to Pradem. This group of researchers then becomes independent scientific practitioners or scholars, thus creating their own journals, societies and schools. Achievements that this scientific community sees at a given moment as forming the basis of its scientific and research practices are also incorporated into textbooks and textbooks, and are re-taught as a whole, focusing on their explanatory capacity and on points that they have been able to explain, regardless of the aspects of their shortcomings and the circumstances of their origin. - The second stage: the stage of ordinary science; where most scientists are conservative people accept the prevailing scientific framework that exists at a certain moment, and seek to apply what they have learned in solving problems that this science has not yet been able to solve, and they persevere in this endeavor with determination and perseverance because of the confidence resulting from the successes they have studied and the consensus prevailing among researchers in this area. Here, scientific research becomes more like a solution to puzzles, for the need for pre-defined rules must be followed to reach the expected solution, and with the passage of time and the development of science begins anomalies that can not be dealt with by ordinary science and the rules in it, that is, they do not agree with the model, and therefore researchers generally ignore or blame their scientific tools or make simple modifications to the model to be explained. The third stage: the crisis stage, when the number of anomalies continues to increase, scientific results are no longer compatible with the model, and therefore there is a need for a "scientific revolution" that replaces the prevailing bardim with a new bardim, and at this stage the rules and foundations of this scientific field are examined, "A new surprise in a game with a set of rules required by the formulation of another set of rules, and after the new group becomes part of science, the scientific project is no longer the competence of those who A new model is being developed, and as the new model stabilizes, scientists return to research at the stage of ordinary science and solve puzzles according to its rules. The themes that concern us and are directly related to our search for rules are: What is the justification for turning mere theories into rules and guidelines? Kohn insists that the rules are not explicitly expressed as rules, and invokes the idea of "language games" and "family similarities" that Wittgenstein spoke of, the rules or conditions necessary and sufficient for an activity to be a game can not be declared, and when we try to do so we get steadily an activity that matches the definition of play, but we do not want to count it as such, or an activity that is excluded by the definition of play, but we want it to play. Thomas argues that the same is true of prescriptive models. When we try to find a specific explicit characteristic of a model in past science or present science, we always find an element within the model that violates that characteristic, but he asserts that this situation does not make the concept of the model completely worse, and a similar situation with respect to "play" does not undermine the legitimate use of the concept of play, and even in the absence of a distinct characteristic in full and explicit form, every teacher acquires his knowledge. If a researcher consistently solves single-mode problems and conducts single-mode experiments conducted by a teacher within a given model, he or she will be familiar with the model's standard methods and patterns, and will not be able to make a clear statement about the methods and scientific experiences he or she has acquired, such as the carpenter's inability to fully describe his or her experience or practical skill. This point is the center of Thomas Kuhn's book, because he proved that the scientific community's self-justification of a scientific picture "like the Newtonian picture" on another image "Anchtinism" depends mainly on a social decision, belonging to the scientific community, but this group is affected as any limited group by metaphysical, religious and philosophical views, and the most famous example of this "fabricated cosmological constant", which Einstein made to maintain his view of the universe, although his theory of relativity originally predicted. Their observations are distorted by their values, but these factors can be overcome because science is a self-correcting social project.”10 Counterfeiting is a big door, and its examples are too many, and we will exemplify here by one example because the denominator requires a general conception of the nature of science only, and the intended example is the falsification of the evolutionary animal scientist Ernst Haeckel, who is well known for falsifying embryos at some point in development. 2- There is no standard to provide a model on another, all scientific images of the universe are considered different games, and the rules of the game of football can not be applied to the rules of the basket, for example, or the expression "transition from one religion to another"13, which is a very accurate expression, because there is no logical argument purely proving the superiority of one model to another, making the man of science "forced by another" access to the new image of the world, but is faith, and increases and decreases. These factors include: the simplicity of theory, the urgent social need, the ability to solve a particular kind of problem, etc. These factors occupy the field of "science sociology". We come here to an important question: Has Kohn succeeded in demonstrating that science is a higher cognitive activity than others? As Alan Chalmers put it, “The fact that science is supposed to be superior to other fields of research actually suggests that when a mental theory conflicts with science, we should change that theory, not the science with which it has conflicted; that we should first assume that we have standards of plausibility independent of our understanding of what is essential to scientific progress is to open the door to imaginary paradise.” It is merely an imposition for which there is no evidence, and this will be openly stated by the following model... References: A 1987 article in Nature by two physicists titled "Where the Science Gone Wrong". (2) Theories of Science, p. (3) The translator's introduction to the book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by the Arab Organization for Translation. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 6 In chapter 3 of his book Thomas Kohn has set several examples of the influence of observation on the model. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 8 This summary is published on the Internet, as part of a complete clearance of the book, for Maha Al-Jaris. 9 Theories of Science, p. Man is the measure, p. 126. (11) Casey Luskin, Haeckel’s Fraudulent Embryo Drawings Are Still Present in Biology Textbooks — Here’s a List, Evolution News, April 3, 2015, evolutionnews.org/2015/04/haeckels_fraudu/, Last Accessed Jan 13, 2018. 12 Such as The Traitors of Truth, where authors William Broad and Nicholas Wade, presented numerous models of ancient and modern on deliberate falsification in science. 13 Theories of Science, p. 14 Theories of Science, pp. 13-14. - Reza Zeidan. — Source: Brahin Center website - Published 2020-11-12 (archived at the Internet Archive) https://braheen.com/articles/science-scientism/مقارنة-حجية-الإجماع-بين-الجماعة-العلمية-والجماعة-البشرية-1