Criterion of falsifiability in the philosophy of science

Important paragraphs on the criterion of falsifiability in the philosophy of science from the book (Towards a descriptive approach to science: a critique of contemporary philosophies of science) by the researcher Reza Zeidan --------------- c) Does the criterion of falsifiability serve as a criterion for separating science from non-science? In fact, the question can be read in a radical and weak way, the question can be radical: does this criterion define science and non-science? The question can be much less radical: has the criterion succeeded in providing us with a systematic tool for separating scientific theories from any other ideas? 1) Fully falsifiability testing is impossible: theories take the form of generalizations, and when we try to prevent something from entering into these generalizations, we have a big problem, for example, the theory that iron expands heat if you encounter a piece of iron that shrinks heat, we may doubt the measurement tools, the shrinkage and the change of heat, and the theory may be correct, but our assumptions regarding the test and our ability to know that the sample When we try to test a theory by comparing it to our observations we must take a large number of additional assumptions to make the theory and observation in relation. If we want to test whether iron is always expanding with heat we must make assumptions about our ability to find pure samples of iron. It is always possible to blame the additional assumptions and not the theory itself that we are trying to test. In extreme cases, we may claim that the apparent observation was not well understood or incorrectly described by the observer. So how can we use observations to discredit theories in the Popper method? This problem is not only about falsifiability, but also a problem for the theory of science.1 Realizing this problem and struggling to solve it, Popper argued that these additional assumptions are conjectures that we should try to test separately, but Popper concludes that logic itself can never force the world to abandon a particular theory, in the face of surprising observations. Logically, it is always possible to blame other assumptions involved in the test. Popper believed that it was the “good” world that wanted to expose the theory itself to tests, and would not try to evade auxiliary assumptions. But what Popper did was move from describing the nature of scientific theories to describing the nature of scientific behavior. Moreover, Popper accepts that we cannot be completely certain about the observational reports we use to discredit theories. We must therefore regard the acceptance of the observational report as a “decision” made wisely. But what kind of difference is that? If observation reports are based solely on “decisions,” which determine our choice of theories, how is this better than direct selection of the theories themselves without concern for observation? Moreover, "the attention which Popper gives to the conscious decisions of individuals, to carry a subjective element, goes against the subsequent appropriation to which he will attribute science, describing it as 'an act of inaction'." Any judgment of my report, such as iron, is falsifiable, when we can prove that there is one iron that does not extend heat, but this falsifiable model is too simple, because it hides a serious difficulty that is due to the complexity of each situation of the real tests. The theory consists of a series of general operations, not a single operative or phrase like the judgment of the report. Moreover, to make a prediction that should be tested experimentally, we would have to add initial conditions, such as the description of the experimental device. Suppose, for example, that we test an astronomical theory, by observing the position of a planet, by means of a telescope. The premises from which we have predicted include a network of words that are the theory to be tested, the initial conditions that are the former positions of the planet and of the Sun, and auxiliary hypotheses such as those indicating the corrections that must be made, in order to take into account the refraction of the planet's light within the Earth's atmosphere and so on. If the prediction derived from these premises turns out to be wrong (for example, if the planet does not appear in the expected location), it is logical to conclude that at least one of the premises must be wrong. But there is no way to identify which premises are wrong. It is the theory to be tested that may have a deficiency, but perhaps the incorrect prediction is made by an auxiliary hypothesis or by part of the description of the initial conditions. Thus it is impossible to conclusively refute a theory, because we cannot eliminate the possibility that the failure of prediction comes from any part of the complex positivism that has been tested, added to the theory itself. The history of astronomy is replete with examples that illustrate this point. Alan Chalmers continues his explanation of the problem with an imaginary example mentioned by another philosopher of science, a case of perverse behavior of a planet. If we assume a pre-Einsteinian physicist, he will take his starting point, in this area: from Newtonian mechanics, from its law of gravitation and we symbolize it from (a), and from elementary conditions that we symbolize (b). Will our Newtonian physical world stumble that this eccentricity, which Newton's theory excludes, is refuted, after the completion of his proof of theory (a)? No, he will assume that there must be a planet (c) that has remained unknown until now, which is disrupting the course of planet (c). He will calculate the mass of this supposed planet (c*), and ask an astronomer who has experimented to test his hypothesis. Will our physical world abandon Newton’s theory and abandon his hypothesis of a planet that disrupts the planet’s trajectory (C)? No. He will assume that a cosmic dust cloud is blocking the planet from us. He will calculate the location and character of this cloud, and ask for research funds to send a satellite to test the validity of his calculations. This story illustrates how a scientific theory can always be protected from falsification by redirecting the attempted refutation toward an entirely different part of a complex network of hypotheses (4). Popper gains nothing by appealing to trust in scientists and their prudent judgment, because this is a subjective matter that he rejects as a rational justification for science. Realistically, the Newtonian theory of gravity has been discredited in the years since it was formulated with observations of the Moon’s orbit. Fifty years later, these observations collapsed, before this refutation was finally cancelled to return it to other factors other than Newtonian theory. This theory turned out to be incompatible with the many values reached in calculating the trajectory of the planet Attar, and yet scientists did not abandon it because of it, but this refutation never came to explain it in a way that would preserve Newton's theory. When Maxwell published the first detailed formulation of the theory of the motion of gases, this theory was belied by quantitative measurements of the specific heat of the gases, and eighteen years later he wrote, commenting on the results of his theory: "Some of these results undoubtedly seem satisfactory to us, within the present state of our knowledge concerning the composition of objects, but there are other results that may lead us in The end of all these hypotheses in which we have so far found refuge, toward this wholly conscious ignorance, which constitutes the opening or prelude to every real advance of knowledge.” We congratulate ourselves once again on the fact that this theory has not been abandoned because of the falsifications generated by quantitative measurements of the specific heat of gases on the Popper method.5 The fact that the falsifiability test is not entirely deterministic has been a limiting influence on the happy reception of this criterion by scientists and others. — Source: Published on Facebook's "Braheen Center" page https://www.facebook.com/braheen.org/posts/pfbid02RagtAnyzUG6BdQAQYdbdjpPu2dJKm4Ekrb7zxxVx88RqztUvuLmcrh2t2qcWQ12Xl