Popper ’s Theory of Knowledge

Popper’s epistemology should be discussed before his scientific philosophy, because “the rest of his philosophy follows from his theory of the objectivity of knowledge.” As we have seen, Popper criticizes the hoministic or inductive perception of the primacy of observation over imposition through Piaget's experiments. Popper argues that "our attempts to impose our explanations upon the world are logically primacy over the perception of homology, that is, over the perception of what we judge to be repetitions." Hence, Popper rejects the classical empirical conception of knowledge, i.e., where the mind is a whiteboard formed by experience, without being as innate as Descartes's innate knowledge, where "it does not see that the mind generates a white page crossed by experience ... nor does it see that the mind is born with innate ideas ... only the mind is born with a set of innate tendencies and expectations, which may change and modify with the development of the organism ... and all these expectations are logical and temporal precedents." It does not matter much to Popper the idea of the primary source of knowledge, the important truth of knowledge. This is the first basis of his theory of knowledge. - Reza Zeidan. More: https://braheen.com/publications/نحو-منهج-وصفي-للعلم-نقد-فلسفات-العلم-المعاصرة — Source: Published on Facebook's "Braheen Center" page