Having presented the mental structure (a valid link between a mental sign/idea and a reference), we must now prove that it is impossible to provoke it by introspection, but there must be a society in which the rules that raise this structure and secure it against self-doubt, and even the reference ...
Now that we have presented the mental structure (a correct association between a mental sign/idea and a reference[1]), we must now prove that it cannot be evoked by introspection. Rather, there must be a society in which the rules that raise this structure and secure it against self-doubt. Indeed, the last authority – or the first and the last if there are mental forms in the sense of Cartesian or linguistic forms in the sense of Chomsky – are the rules of "human community", the criterion of "the correct use of rationality".
The most famous and powerful arguments against introspection[2] are Wittgenstein's arguments in the passages concerning the "special argument of language" in his philosophical research, and I have read much of what has been written in its support and refutation, I have found nothing influential except what was written by Saul Kripke; who devoted a reading to it that we will discuss, but mostly philosophers[3] after Wittgenstein's book record its profound impact in several fields, and some have described it as: a radical shift in the history of philosophy.
Turning a child’s self-image into a “symbol,” meaning, or norm by simply meditating on the self is impossible:
Although Descartes, and many philosophers since Plato, said that "self-awareness" or the realization of mental firsts comes directly from meditation on the self isolated from society by introspection, but what the child finds before learning the rules of looking at the world is undoubtedly different after the acquisition of language or after the stimulation of mental structure, even if he seems to see "red" as we see it, and this on all subjective experiences:
- The self that he understands through the reference of others to it is completely different from the pre-language or thinking involved in relationships, the first self before learning the rules can be talked about if we know how the amoeba feels its perspective!
- Conceptual relationships such as containment[4], which are applied in the self I said to myself or the community I am at a wedding or article chair at home.
- Colleges and the limits of words and symbols, it is very difficult to determine for a child the meaning of "breaking" with all the examples and semantic fields of the word, but the child understands from limited examples the rule of using the word, self-impression before language can with training through examples to understand the rule as we said in the compound respect for the rules.
If you asked Descartes, Locke, Barclay, or Hume about the sense of self and the mental processes, the answer would be: it is a direct and completely private process, whatever their position on the duality of self and body, but Wittgenstein denies that it is possible to distinguish sensory data and psychological states without linking the community of each case to a particular word, and this is to recognize the self and the world through an objective sign relationship, and either special language or the creation of subjective meaning through sensory data is impossible.
- Reza Zeidan.
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Source: Published on Facebook's "Braheen Center" page